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Due to unprecedented fires and rise in temperature cli-
mate change is occurring rapidly, melting the Arctic ice
and uncovering new areas for expropriation of natural
resources. Such expropriation needs to occur in a sus-
tainable way, respecting the environment and the indi-
genous people. To achieve this, all inherent risks arising
from any environmental threat (oil spill/any type of envir-
onmental accident, cyber risks of any nature) to oil and
gas installations need be identified and environmental
liability and cyber-risks insurance coverage need be in
place. This article discusses the way for such insurance
coverage to be placed and worded. It argues that the
traditional (marine and other) property insurance poli-
cies coverage and wording is inefficient, as it ends up
being fragmented due to the numerous policy exclusions
and limitations; it also puts forward an argument for the
need to have specific wording and cover for specialized
risks, in relation to the operation of oil and gas installa-
tions in the Arctic and cyber-risk threats, taking into
account potential environmental impacts and hazards.
This article also argues that for the time being, as busi-
nesses and governments including those of the EU and
the Member States become increasingly reliant on tech-
nology, it is imperative that additional cyber-related risks
are identified and minimized or transferred externally.
Finally, it offers some suggestions about cybersecurity
policies covering specialized risks.
Keywords: Sustainability, Arctic, Cybersecurity, Envir-
onmental pollution, Environmental pollution liability,
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1 Introduction
In the Arctic, as the climate change pace accelerates, new
geographical areas, most of which are off-shore, will
emerge, with the potential of expropriation of natural
resources. Alongside these newly emerging exploitable
areas, will also arise the need to expropriate in a sustain-
able manner and to provide adequate mitigating measures,
in order to address potential environmental harm or
pollution.1
The globalization of environmental risk poses a
mounting challenge to policy makers, not least because
it now entails the cyber-risk relating to malicious cyber-
attacks on oil and gas off-shore installations. As of yet,
the rules of responsibility for harm production remain
underdeveloped, in spite of the negotiation and imple-
mentation of numerous international environmental
agreements.2 The civil liability regime for marine and
oil pollution was the first to broaden compensation obli-
gations beyond personal injury and property damage to
include environmental impairment and has paved the
way for the liability rule for all oil and gas expropriation
activities.3 Several types of insurance might respond to
pay for losses stemming from an oil spill, including,
insurance policies for first-party property, ‘business
interruption’ and ‘loss of production income’ insurance,
‘directors & officers liability’ (D&O) insurance, ‘event
cancellation’ insurance, ‘trade disruption’ insurance,
‘environmental liability’ insurance, marine insurance,
‘comprehensive general liability’ (CGL) insurance,
insurance for operator’s extra expenses – occurred for
the control of the well, physical damage insurance,
workers compensation or employers liability insurance,
as well as cyber insurance for risks related to malicious
cyber-attacks on the infrastructure of oil and gas instal-
lations, which can lead to multiple types of losses and
damages, including environmental oil pollution.4
Cyber-insurance has a broad definition and although it
was originally defined as insurance for the damages to
‘physical’ computer equipment, nowadays it represents a
risk mitigation tool for IT/cyber-related losses, covering
damages or losses from information/IT systems and net-
works. It is suggested5 that cyber-insurance promotes the
implementation of good security measures. However,
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innovations in the cyberspace introduce new types of
losses and act as barriers to effective coverage. In addi-
tion, the Internet of Things (IoT) is shifting cybersecurity
from protecting information assets to physical goods pre-
viously unrelated to computers.6 At present, cyber insur-
ance does not dominate the overall non-life insurance
market,7 but it is one of the fastest-growing new lines of
insurance business and cybersecurity is recognized as one
of the top global risks.8 Meanwhile, more and more
traditional insurance contracts exclude specific losses
linked to cybersecurity, and therefore, it is imperative
that a separate cyber-insurance market develops, in an
effort to also assist industry practitioners and regulators
to fully understand potential future systemic risks.9
The (offshore) energy insurance market is highly spe-
cialized and because the limits of insurance are usually in
the excess of USD 1 billion, there is no single insurer who
covers the entire risk exposure. Oil and gas firms, whether
they have experienced cyber-attacks or not, are incenti-
vized to assure that their business processes are resilient,
in the face of cyber-events, internally and externally, to
comprehend the impact of systemic risk to cyber-events,
and be responsive and resilient in addressing such emer-
ging risks and protecting critical oil and gas installations
and other infrastructure. Because we live in an era where
there is an increased use of the IoT across the energy
sector, this also increases the vulnerability to cyber-
attacks. Therefore, it is imperative to address cyber-risk
as a key operational risk and implement measures to
prevent, detect and respond to cyber-threats in a holistic
way. In addition, the provision of more detailed informa-
tion from the energy industry and the cooperation with
underwriters, will help the insurance industry improve its
coverage of energy assets and to further develop cyber-
insurance products. The insurance as a mitigating mea-
sure and option apart, businesses with operational tech-
nology networks (OT), including oil and gas
expropriation installations need to be in a position to
implement mitigating measures so as to understand
cyber risks and be able to assess, identify and rectify
cybersecurity vulnerabilities and also prevent attacks
that exploit these vulnerabilities.10 Such mitigating mea-
sures, together with cyber-insurance will help offset the
potential financial impacts of a cyber-attack.11
2 The case of ‘Deepwater Horizon’
and the ‘Saudi Aramco’ 2012 &
2019 Incidents: The Need for
Response to Cyber and
Environmentally Impaired Incidents
On 20 April 2010, the Deepwater Horizon (DWH), a semi-
submersible mobile offshore drilling rig owned and oper-
ated by Transocean Ltd., caught fire and sank in the Gulf
of Mexico, off the shores of Louisiana. The rig was drilling
a prospect known as ‘Macondo’, some fifty miles off the
coast of Louisiana, in 5,000 feet of water. British
Petroleum (BP) Plc – along with its partners Anadarko
Petroleum Corp. and Mitsui Oil Exploration Co. – acquired
the prospect in 2008 in a sale of leases run by the USA
government’s Minerals Management Services. The well
had been drilled to 18,000 feet when a blow-out occurred.
The explosion, and fire that followed, killed eleven out of
the 126-man crew. A day and a half later the rig collapsed
into the sea and sunk, and oil begun to spread across the
surface of the water, eventually making landfall to the
north-east.12 BP, being the majority stakeholder in
‘Macondo’ was largely identified with the spill. Anadarko
Petroleum Corp. and Mitsui Oil Exploration Co. owned
25% and 10% stakes in the well, respectively, and hence
also a share in the cost of responding to the oil spill. The
oil platform was being leased by Transocean Ltd. to BP
Plc., and following the accident sat on the sea floor over
5,000 feet below sea level. Prior to the explosion on 20
April 2010, Halliburton Co. had been engaged in cement-
ing operations on the well, and cementing operations had
previously been associated with other oil-well accidents.13
The amount of oil and gas, escaping from the subsurface
well had been estimated to have been in the range of
35,000–60,000 barrels of oil a day, making the incident
the largest oil spill in USA history.14 The ‘Macondo’ oil-
6 Anderson et al., supra n. 5; P. Petratos, A. Sandberg & F.
Zhou, Cyber insurance, in Handbook of Cyber-Development,
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2017)
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html (accessed 3 Mar. 2020).
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9 Anderson et al., supra n. 5; Petratos, Sandberg & Zhou, supra
n. 6, 809–836 at 809–810; Marsh, supra n. 7.
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denergy.org (accessed 3 Mar. 2020).
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Energy Trends 3–6, at 3 (2010)
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well, was initially sealed in mid July 2010, eighty-seven
days after the incident occurred, it was then subsequently
further sealed in early August 2010, having reached the
amount of four, one million oil barrels, and finally cemen-
ted on 19 September 2010.
In 2012, the oil and gas world witnessed the worst hack
ever seen to that date. A monstrous cyber-attack on Saudi
Aramco, one of the world’s largest oil companies, almost
halted the world’s oil production and almost created a
worldwide economic crash. The incident entailed one of
the computer technicians on Saudi Aramco’s information
technology team opening a scam email and innocently
clicking on a bad link, hence without knowing it, allowing
the hackers in. The incident of the cyber-attack occurred
in August 2012 during the Islamic holy month of Rama-
dan, when most Saudi Aramco employees were on holi-
day. Initially, some employees noticed their computers
were having problems in operating. In a matter of hours,
35.000 computers were partially wiped or totally
destroyed, as a result of which operations were halted
and Saudi Aramco’s ability to supply 10% of the world’s
oil was suddenly at risk. Oil production remained steady
but managing supplies, shipping, contracts with govern-
ments and business partners, was forced to happen on
paper and the company was suddenly forced to be pro-
pelled back into 1970s technology, using typewriters and
faxes. As a result, the company temporarily stopped sell-
ing oil to domestic gas tank trucks and later on, after
seventeen days, the corporation relented and started giv-
ing oil away for free to keep it flowing within Saudi
Arabia. A massive army of IT people were hired as
independent consultants to help secure all of Saudi Ara-
mco’s satellite offices in Africa, Europe and the Middle
East. Aramco’s representatives were flown directly to
computer factory floors in Southeast Asia to purchase
every computer hard drive currently on the manufacturing
line. This caused a temporary worldwide shortage on hard
drives, as Aramco bought in one instance 50,000 drives.
Five months later, with a newly secured computer net-
work and an expanded cybersecurity team, Saudi Aramco
brought its system back online. However, the repercus-
sion and ramifications were still to be felt for many
months to follow thereafter. It is a blessing in disguise
that no connection to networks was possible for storage
tanks at that time. The attack was a wake-up call for the
possible ramifications of a possible further cyber-attack in
the oil and gas sector.15
In September 2019, drone attacks at two Saudi Aramco
oil facilities forced the shut-down of half its total oil
production. The strikes targeted Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq
and Khurais oil facilities, sparking concern about global
oil supply stability, which severely disrupted global
energy infrastructure and sent crude prices soaring by
double digits. Abqaiq, located in the kingdom’s oil-rich
Eastern province, is the world’s largest oil processing
facility and crude oil stabilization plant with a processing
capacity of more than seven million barrels per day (bpd).
Khurais, which lies about 110 miles southwest of Abqaiq,
has capacity to pump around 1.5 million bpd.16
Following the attacks, Saudi Aramco was looking to
buy insurance against war and terror attacks after a dama-
ging drone and missile attack on some of its oil facilities
in September 2019. Aramco had not insured against all
risks and its cover did not protect it from terrorism or acts
of war. Available additional insurance options would
range from cover against a terror attack or sabotage
through to full coverage, which includes war or civil
war, along with compensation for the cost of business
interruption.17 In addition cyber-risk insurance coverage
was sought to be added on any additional war risk cover-
age, to enhance recovery available options.
Not only the DWH which was owed to a mechanical
failure, but also the Saudi Aramco cyber-attack in 2012
forced for a response in the regulatory landscape for
environmental pollution liability and triggered changes
in the insurance industry landscape regarding environ-
mental and cyber-related risk coverage. However, the
response from the insurance industry has not been the
one anticipated and the insurance industry itself has
been criticized as failing to keep up with changes in the
legal and regulatory environment post these events.18
Due to the fact that oil pollution damage can occur as a
result of an off-shore oil expropriation incident or due to
cyber-security attacks in oil and gas companies’ head-
quarters, as the DWH and Saudi Aramco incident have
revealed, oil spill related costs can accrue and make it
extremely difficult for companies to draw a line, as not
only is it difficult to anticipate the actual losses occurred
during oil pollution and other general or cyber-related
liability incidents, but to also place caps in such liabilities.
Post these incidents, insurers have tended to add crisis
management services to their environmental insurance
solutions. Regulators have also appeared as stepping up
their enforcement of environmental and other laws. In
addition, it was realized that there is a lack of uptake of
financial security instruments to cover all damage from
the most infrequent and costly offshore accidents.19
(16 June 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/06/16/
16greenwire-usgs-director-quietly-wages-fearless-war-on-oi-
83792.html (accessed 3 Mar. 2020).
15 J. Pagliery, The Inside Story of the Biggest Hack in History,
CNN Business (8 May 2015), https://money.cnn.com/2015/08/
05/technology/aramco-hack/index.html (accessed 3 Mar. 2020).
16 D. Reid, Saudi Aramco Reveals Attack Damage at Oil Pro-
duction Plants, CNBC (21 Sept. 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/
2019/09/20/oil-drone-attack-damage-revealed-at-saudi-aramco-
facility.html (accessed 3 Mar. 2020).
17 M. Safi & G. Waerden, Everything You Need to Know About the
Saudi Arabia Oil Attacks, The Guardian (16 Sept. 2019), https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/16/saudi-arabia-oil-attacks-
everything-you-need-to-know (accessed 3 Mar. 2020).
18 Pagliery, supra n. 15; CIR, Lloyd’s: Offshore Energy Under-
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Therefore, extensive and responsive mitigating measures
would have to have been in place alongside extensive
insurance cover for cyber-attack risks. This has even
more been reiterated following the September 2019
drone attacks on Abqaiq, Saudi Aramco’s crude proces-
sing centre, and in the Khurais oilfield. The latest drone
attack has forced the company to work harder so as to
implement measures that would allow it to mitigate
against an equally possible risk of cyber-attacks. Saudi
Aramco has since been working intensively to secure
their infrastructure, as they recognize it now as a constant
threat.
Possible recommendations for future steps could
include the introduction and collection of data on
damages resulting from such incidents to help better
address insurance coverage needs, or the creation of an
international organization to monitor safety standards and
establish an international safety standard as a safety goal
for all drilling industries to meet, which, would act as a
mitigating measure in implementation and, in this way,
would also help streamline the insurance coverage offered
and establish a stable ‘soft’ insurance market.
In addition, because a cyber-attack on an operational
technology environment can have serious and wide ran-
ging consequences beyond just financial losses, including
prolonged outages of critical services, environmental
damage and even the loss of human life, it is imperative
that major operators not only take out additional insur-
ance coverage but also assert stable mitigating measures
and increase focus and spending also on their operational
technology systems, which will enable them to identify
and respond to cyber-security vulnerabilities.20
Sutherland argues that potential environmental expo-
sures for energy companies entail large-scale catastrophic
events with a considerable scale of potential losses. Post
the DWH and Saudi Aramco incident, the London market
had casualty offerings for the energy market such as
follow-form excess liability limits available up to USD
50mn, or catastrophic, high excess limits available for up
to USD 150mn. Such coverage was offered as an endor-
sement to the general casualty policy, for pollution events
or through the guise of environmental impairment liability
insurance (EIL) so as to be able to also cover regulatory
obligations.21
Faure, Philipsen and Wang argue that possible recom-
mendations for future steps, could include the introduc-
tion and collection of data on incidents related to damages
resulting from (off-shore) oil and gas activities, or an
international agreement for offshore-related incidents
which would have to include a wide legal regime of strict
liability for damage caused by offshore-related risks,
establish a system of joint and several liability for the
various parties involved in the offshore-related risk, and
avoid financial caps on liability, in an effort to fully
expose those involved in the offshore-related risks to the
social costs of their activity and establish a mechanism
able to facilitate early compensation payments to specific
vulnerable groups of victims negatively affected by off-
shore- related incidents.22
3 The Environmental Pollution
Insurance Landscape
3.1 Evolution and characteristic features of
environmental insurance
In the early 1940s, property and casualty insurers started
offering CGL insurance, which covered liability arising
out of accidental or unexpected and unintended property
damage or bodily injury that happened during the policy
period, even if a claim was not made until long after the
policy period.23
From the early 1970s, property and casualty insurers
began to include the ‘qualified’ pollution exclusion in
their policies, which excluded bodily injury or property
damage unless sudden and accidental.24 Around 1986,
insurers began including the ‘absolute’ pollution exclu-
sion in CGL policies, which excluded coverage for pollu-
tion claims whether or not they were sudden and
accidental.25 By the mid-1980s, insurers either stopped
offering EIL coverage, or policyholders stopped buying
EIL coverage, either because it had become prohibitively
expensive or due to the fact that claim expenses had
outpaced premium revenues. However, by the late
1990s, new environmental insurance products began to
appear such as ‘Pollution Legal Liability Insurance’,
‘Clean- up Cost Cap Insurance’, or a number of more
specialized products, such as ‘Contractors Pollution Lia-
bility Insurance’, ‘Commercial Real Estate Pollution
Legal Liability Insurance’, and ‘Contaminated Property
Development Insurance’.
Plumer, Lathrop, Suomela and Waeger, all state that
different coverages may apply to pollution that begins
before the policy period as compared to pollution that
begins during the policy period. Additionally, some poli-
cies only cover ‘sudden’ pollution events (i.e. ‘abrupt’),
and some policies may require that the pollution be dis-
covered within a defined period of time (e.g. within an X
amount of hours post the occurring event), or they may
have very short reporting periods (e.g. thirty days) in
order for coverage to apply, coupled with the fact that
different coverages are required to address potential on-
site clean-up versus other third-party liability.26
20 Ibid.
21 S. Sutherland , Paying for Pollution?, AIG Environmental
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23 M. Plumer, A. Lathrop & K. Suomela, Insurance for Envir-
onmental Claims, New Appleman on Insurance 33–39 at 33–34
(2010).
24 For example, ISO 1973 Standard Form for CGL Policy.
25 Plumer, Lathrop & Suomela, supra n. 23, 33–39 at 33–34.
26 A. Waeger, Current Insurance Policies for Insuring Against
Environmental Risks in Environmental Insurance: Emerging
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Merkin rightly emphasizes the fact that because ‘sudden’
and ‘unexpected’ loss coverage is usually found in property
casualty policies, it follows that it does not quite fit the case
of environmental pollution, because environmental pollu-
tion as such is usually gradual. Hence, it is argued that there
is some ambiguity as to what ‘sudden’ actually means, in the
context of EIL policies. The real question that arises here is
at which stage is ‘sudden’ established in terms of coverage
purposes. Property policies generally require a loss from one
or more specified perils to arise from an accidental, sudden
or unforeseen event or occurrence.27
The word ‘accidental’, means that the loss suffered by the
assured has be an ‘unlooked-for mishap or an untoward
event which is not expected or designed.’28 The mere fact
that the insured subject matter has sustained damage is,
therefore, not sufficient to trigger coverage under a property
policy. By way of example, if the subject matter
disintegrates29 or collapses and the assured cannot show
that there has been an accidental event triggering the
damage, then there is no recovery.30 In Pacific Chemicals
Pte Ltd v. MSIG Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd31 it was held
that the phrase ‘any unforeseen and sudden physical loss
destruction or damage’ meant that the damage had to be
sudden and accidental, so that it was irrelevant that the peril
which had caused the damage itself occurred slowly.32
In relation to clean-up costs, because such costs are not
included in the coverage of property liability policies, the
need for EIL policies arose, in order to have such cover also
provided. Clean-up costs are not to be considered as falling
into the category of damages, hence the definition33 which is
usually to be found in CLG policies is a rather limiting one.
The term ‘liability at law by way of damages’ and equiva-
lent wording has been held to not encompass compensation
payable under a statutory obligation which imposes liability
irrespective of the fault of the assured.34
In relation to marine policies, it is not compulsory in
law to have environmental pollution liability coverage,
however it is established in practice that an obligation
exists by contract to have EIL insurance in place. It is also
worth mentioning that usually EIL policies are reinsured
in the London market, under English law. It follows from
the above that the reinsured will have an obligation to
hand over the conduct of settlement to reinsurers and get
their prior consent.
3.2 Marine insurance coverage and claims in relation
to an oil spill in the Arctic
Shipowners are free to assume the risk of trading and
navigating on Arctic routes subject to obtaining suitable
marine insurance, however the norm in the marine
insurance market is to exclude or limit the coverage
of Arctic marine perils through the imposition of navi-
gating limitations for vessels as the passage in Arctic
waters entails high risks.
Marine insurance in the Arctic is disadvantaged due to
limited knowledge and information which results in
insurers not being able to identify and assess the risks
likely to be encountered in the various shipping routes.
This uncertainty in defining and assessing the risks as
well as the lack of reliable data results in increased
deductibles for ice-related damages and in the considera-
tion of Arctic related risks by insurers on a case by case
basis. Although the international insurance market is pre-
pared to underwrite shipping risks in the three Arctic
corridors, i.e. The Northeast Passage (NEP), the Nothwest
Passage (NWP) and the Transpolar Passage (TPP), how-
ever, the premiums charged will be different with the ones
for the NWP and TPP being certainly higher than these
for the NEP on the basis of the variously differentiated
risk factors that exist in the various passages.
With regards to navigating limits, although the Institute
Time Clauses do not refer to them, this is done via the
reference to the Institute Warranties which exclude perils
of the seas in certain areas and contain a list of warranties
relating to geographical limits of navigation. ‘Held cov-
ered’ clauses also allow the assured shipowner to cover
marine risks and to avoid the consequence of no insurance
liability and coverage in the case that the navigating limits
are breached.35 Entry is allowed into the Arctic only
Issues and Latest Developments on the New Coverage and
Insurance Cost Recover, 339–472, 342–343 (ALI-ABA Course
of Study Boston 8–9 May 2008), https://www.ali-cle.org/doc/
frontmatter/CN050_fm.pdf (accessed 3 Mar. 2020); Plumer,
Lathrop & Suomela, supra n. 23, 33–39 at 33–34.
27 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Plc v. Field [1996] 3 All E.R. 517;
Marketform Managing Agency Ltd v. Amashaw Pty Ltd [2018]
NSWCA 70.
28 Of the many authorities on ‘accident’, see e.g. Fenton v.
Thorley [1903] A.C. 443; Patrick v. Royal London Mutual
Insurance Society Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 421; C A Blackwell
(Contractors) Ltd v. Gerling Allegemeine Verischerungs AG
[2007] EWHC 94 (Comm); Sheehan v. Lloyds Names Munich
Re Syndicate Ltd [2017] FCA 1340.
29 Weir Services Australia Pty Ltd v. AXA Corporate Solutions
Assurance [2018] NSWCA 100, concerned a liability policy, but
the same principles are applicable - there the Court was able to
point to a fortuity.
30 Leeds Beckett University v. Travelers Insurance Company Ltd
[2017] EWHC 558 (TCC).
31 Pacific Chemicals Pte Ltd v. MSIG Insurance (Singapore) Pte
Ltd [2012] S.G.H.C. 198; see also Australia Paper Manufac-
turers Ltd v. American International Underwriters [1994] 1 V.R.
685.
32 See also Vee H Aviation Pty Ltd v. Australian Underwriting
Pool Pty Ltd unreported Dec. 1996, (ACT); R. Merkin, Colin-
vaux’s Law of Insurance, (11th ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell,
2016), para. 20–055.
33 Historically CGL policies would typically promise to provide
coverage for all sums which the insured shall become legally
obligated to pay as damages because of property damage to
which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence.
34 Tatham, Bromage & Co v. Burr (The Engineer) [1898] A.C.
382; Hall Brothers Steamship Co Ltd v. Young [1939] 1 K.B.
748.
35 P. K. Mukherje & H. Liu, Legal Regime of Marine Insurance
in Arctic Shipping: Safety and Environmental Implications, in
Sustainable Shipping in a Changing Arctic WMU Studies on
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where permission has been obtained from the underwriter
and where the requisite additional premium is agreed.
Seaworthiness is a cornerstone element in marine
insurance contracts in that it is an implied warranty as
per section 39 of the Marine Insurance Act (MIA) 1906.
The ship needs be seaworthy, i.e. reasonably fit in all
respects to encounter the ordinary perils of the sea at
any stage of the maritime adventure, and the insurer is
not liable if the assured sends the ship to sea in an
unseaworthy state. Sea ice may be considered an ordinary
peril if it exists in the normal course of a voyage in the
Arctic. It will not be considered an ordinary peril if it
exists only in certain ‘ice-manifested’ waters posing
extraordinary and unpredictable navigational hazards.
However, if a vessel is equipped for ice navigation in
accordance with the Polar Code, then for its purposes
the presence of ice could be an ordinary peril in that
context. Hence, it follows that any vessel entering Arctic
waters and non-complying with the Polar Code constitu-
tes an unseaworthy vessel if such non-compliance leads to
the vessel being non-fit in all respects for its intended
purpose to navigate in the Arctic waters. Failure also to
comply with the Polar Code is an emanation of breach of
the seaworthiness requirement, for, the objective of the
Polar Code is to ensure, inter alia, ship safety in Polar
waters including the Arctic.36
Due to the fragility of the Arctic environment, P&I
insurance covers third party liability of the shipowner for
pollution damage causing harm to the marine environ-
ment. Again navigation limits play the role of promissory
warranties which – if breached – will relieve the P&I
Club from all liability as per the provisions of the MIA
1906. Mandatory insurance in the form of P&I cover is
required for the potential liability of the shipowner for
ship-source pollution damage in relation to Arctic ship-
ping. In the case of the Arctic waters the P&I clubs face
payment of indemnification associated with enhanced
risks due to the presence of ice which has the potential
for engendering casualties including collisions and
groundings and consequential pollution in an environment
that is ecologically fragile and where the pollutant does
not really dissipate. The role of the P&I Club is crucial to
the indemnification of pollution damage.37
In addition to the several types of insurance available to
respond to pay for losses stemming from oil spills, in
addition, insurance may be provided for mitigation costs.38
However, in the domestic London market it has already
proved necessary to adopt specific policies for environ-
mental issues, so as to provide insurance for mitigation
and remediation costs as well as to deal with the problem
that policies traditionally cover only sudden fortuities
rather than gradual environmental damage. Because the
extent of property damage during an oil spill is often
unclear, in many cases the coverage sought is the one
provided for under an ‘all-risk’ policy whereby once a
policyholder shows that it has suffered a loss, the burden
of proof shifts to the insurer to show that the loss is not
covered. Equally, a ‘named peril’ policy might be opted
for, although it would only provide coverage for perils
expressly listed. Both types of policies may contain exclu-
sions to coverage. The likely claims to arise involve
usually issues related to the basic elements of first-party
coverage, i.e. (1) issues relating to covered property, (2)
issues relating to the existence of a sustained physical loss
or damage, and (3) the fact that there has to be a claim
resulting from a covered peril.
Physical loss or damage has been defined in case law
as well, such as in Columbiaknit, Inc. v. Affiliated FM
Insurance Co.,39 and in Trinity Industries, Inc. v. Insur-
ance Co. of North America.40 In the case of the BP oil
spill, claims against BP Plc. offered a unique intersection
of environmental, tort, administrative, maritime, and
insurance law.41
3.3 Modern environmental coverage policies and
arising disputes
The case law, regarding disputes under modern environ-
mental policies, is not that vast as one would perhaps
expect. The litigated issue under modern pollution cover-
age has mainly been the issue of whether the particular
claim is one the specific pollution policy was intended to
cover.42
In Alan Corp. v. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co.,43
the insurer, International Surplus Lines Insurance Cor-
poration (ISLIC), issued a pollution liability policy cover-
ing third party claims for property damage or bodily
injury arising out of a pollution incident if the pollution
incident and the third-party claim both occurred during
the policy period. The policy covered ‘reasonable and
necessary clean-up costs incurred by the insured in the
discharge of a legal obligation validly imposed through
governmental action which is initiated during the policy
period’. ISLIC denied coverage for Alan Corp.’s clean-up
costs because, although the pollution incident occurred
during the policy period, the governmental action was
Maritime Affairs, 191–225, at 202–205 (L. Hildebrand, L. Brig-
ham & T. Johansson eds, Springer 2018).
36 Mukherje & Liu, supra n. 35, 191–225, at 208–209.
37 Mukherje & Liu, supra n. 35, at 215, 217, 219.
38 For example companies may purchase equipment, such as
booms, in an effort to protect property from contamination; L.
Kellner et al., Insurance Coverage Issues for Third-Party Busi-
nesses and Municipalities with Losses Due to the Oil Rig
Explosion in the Gulf of Mexico (Insurance Coverage Alert,
Dickstein Shapiro LLP May 2010).
39 Columbiaknit, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Insurance Co., 1999 US
Dist. LEXIS 11873 at 9 (D. Or. 1999).
40 Trinity Industries, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America,
916 F.2d 267, 270–71 (5th Cir. 1990).
41 W. C. Merlin Jr., Understanding the Valuation Issues, in
Conference Oil in the Gulf – Litigation and Insurance Cover-
age, 1 (HB Litigation Conferences Atlanta; USA 2010).
42 Plumer, Lathrop & Suomela, supra n. 21, 33–39 at 33–34.
43 Alan Corp. v. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 823 F.
Supp. 33 (D. Mass. 1993); Plumer, Lathrop & Suomela, supra
n. 21, 33–39 at 33–34.
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not initiated until after the policy period. The court upheld
ISLIC’s denial of coverage.44
D.C. Operating Co., Limited Liability Company (LLC)
v. Indian Harbor Insurance Co,45 highlighted the often
cited issue with regards to claims made under modern
pollution coverage, whereby the fact that policyholders
purchase pollution coverage as a result of an existing
detection of contamination and so as to contemplate for
potentially additional undetected contamination, does not
guarantee that there will be no exclusion of the entire risk.
In addition, the practice of ‘post-claim underwriting’
by insurers may result in the insurer establishing that the
assured did not disclose important information and hence
avoid coverage, as was the case in John R. McKenzie
Jobber, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co46 and as was
further illustrated in Viacom International, Inc. v. Admiral
Ins. Co.,47 which allow us to conclude that policyholders
may trigger current and historical CGL policies to cover
the same claims, but their availability will largely depend
upon the applicable policy language, (e.g. ‘other insur-
ance’ provisions). Indeed, in Viacom International, Inc. v.
Admiral Ins. Co.,48 the court interpreted a somewhat
unusual ‘other insurance’ provision in the EIL policies,
which allowed the policyholder to treat the EIL coverage
as either primary or excess to other applicable
insurance.49
4 Specific Insurance Issues Raised in
Case of a Major Oil Spill
Accidents such as the DWH oil spill raise certain
insurance issues. Such issues pertain inter alia to the
insurability of the incident per se as well as of the
kind of damages sustained, on the environmental side,
and to the question of whether such liability should be
capped or not. In relation to the specific insurance
issues raised by the DWH accident, and more specifi-
cally in relation to the actual insurability of the
damages sustained, due to the fact that most EIL
policies are reinsured in the London market, it is
essential to assess insurability under the scope of
reinsurance case law.
Prior to the decision of the House of Lords in Wasa
International Insurance Co Ltd v. Lexington Insurance
Co,50 the nature of the reinsured’s insurable interest was
debatable, i.e. one view pertained that the reinsured’s
insurable interest exists in its liability, which renders a
reinsurance agreement something akin to a liability
policy,51 whereas the alternative view was that reinsur-
ance is ‘the insurance of an insurable interest in the
subject matter of an original insurance’,52 however the
point had been left open in a number of cases.53 In Wasa
International Insurance Co Ltd v. Lexington Insurance
Co,54 the House of Lords took the view that reinsurance
was not liability insurance at all, but constituted a further
insurance on the original subject matter, although it was
accepted that there was much to be said for the liability
insurance argument and that it was open to the parties to
frame their contact as one on liability.55
Following a major off-shore accident various mechan-
isms, i.e. financial and insurance instruments, are used to
cover liability risks and as such often cover both first-
party damage, including well-control, and liability. One
way to provide adequate coverage is via self-insurance
which serves as a mechanism whereby larger players in
the market run the risk themselves, a) either via issuing
pure self-insurance which in essence acts as a reserve for
potential losses and whereby operators use their balance
sheet to guarantee payment in case of a major accident
occurring, or b) via a captive which would be created by a
major offshore operator and would function de facto as an
insurance company, however with no loss spreading.
Existing insurance coverage for off-shore activities
mainly covers physical damage and liability exposures.
The risks may involve construction, physical damage,
removal of wreckage, control of the well, and liability.
The policies involved include ‘off-shore physical damage
coverage’ for all risks associated with physical loss or
44 Ibid.
45 D.C. Operating Co., LLC v. Indian Harbor Insurance Co,
decision and order granting in part and denying in part the
defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint, No. 07-CV-0116
(S.D.N.Y. 27 Mar. 2007).
46 John R. McKenzie Jobber, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Casualty
Co., No. 07–214, 2007 US Dist. LEXIS 84169 (M.D. Fla. 14
Nov. 2007).
47 Viacom International, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., No. L-1739-99
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 21 Apr. 2006) (reprinted in 19–9
Mealey’s Poll. Liab. Rep. 21 (2006)).
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd v. Lexington Insurance
Co [2009] Lloyd’s Rep. I.R. 675, reversing [2008] Lloyd’s Rep.
I.R. 510.
51 DR Insurance v. Seguros America Banamex [1993] 1 Lloyd’s
Rep. 120. Cf. Agnew v. Lansforsakringsbolagens AB [2003]
Lloyd’s Rep. I.R. 637.
52 Delver v. Barnes (1807) 1 Taunt. 48; Mackenzie v. Whitworth
(1875) 1 Ex. D. 36; Uzielli v. Boston Marine (1884) 15 Q.B.D.
11; British Dominions General v. Duder [1925] A.C. 639; For-
sikringsaktieselskapet National v. Attorney General [1925] A.C.
639; Toomey v. Eagle Star [1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 516; CNA
International Reinsurance Co Ltd v. Companhia de Seguros
Tranquilidade SA [1999] Lloyd’s Rep. I.R. 289; CGU Interna-
tional Insurance Plc v. AstraZenica Insurance Co Ltd [2006]
Lloyd’s Rep. I.R. 409; Zurich Insurance Plc UK Branch v.
International Energy Group Ltd [2015] UKSC 33 for a state-
ment by Lord Sumption that reinsurance is not liability
insurance.
53 Charter Reinsurance Co Ltd v. Fagan [1996] 3 All E.R. 46;
Enterprise Oil Ltd v. Strand Insurance Co Ltd [2007] Lloyd’s
Rep. I.R. 186. Section 9(1) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906,
simply refers to the reinsured reinsuring the risk.
54 Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd v. Lexington Insurance
Co [2008] Lloyd’s Rep. I.R. 510, reversed [2009] Lloyd’s Rep.
I.R. 675.
55 Merkin, supra n. 32, para. 20–055.
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damage to fixed off-shore drilling, production and accom-
modation facilities; ‘operator’s extra expense’ (OEE), a
type of policy offered to oil and gas companies that
provides coverage for expenses associated with regaining
control of a well and removing or cleaning up seepage/
pollution; ‘environmental/pollution liability’ which pro-
vides coverage for bodily injury, property damage and
clean-up costs as a result of a pollution incident; ‘business
interruption/loss of production income’ which provides
coverage for energy businesses against loss due to tem-
porary interruption in oil and gas supply from an offshore
facility; CGL which provides coverage for claims an
energy business is legally obligated to pay as a result of
bodily injury or property damage to a third party; ‘work-
er’s compensation/employer’s liability’ providing cover-
age for claims arising out of employee injuries or deaths
incurred while employees are in the line of duty.
As offshore facilities will usually obtain property
damage coverage and add casualty coverage for covering
clean-up and third-party liability, often one limit will be
used for the whole insurance policy, thus creating a chal-
lenge for the compensation of third-party liability. Caps in
liability may also prove dysfunctional in that they may
not allow the allocation of the true sum corresponding to
the damage caused by operators in the case of a major oil
incident. However, caps in liability sums allow a better
and more pragmatic operation of the market. Whilst pol-
icy makers can rely on insurance, together with self-
insurance, as the most important instrument to cover
off-shore related risks, at the same time they need to
realize the limitations imposed in terms of available insur-
ance coverage. Post DWH, discussions have indicated
what most insurers confirm, i.e. that the available offshore
insurance coverage in the market is around USD 500
million to USD 1.5 billion. However, the estimation of
the available coverage by insurers may not necessarily
reflect a realistic indication of the future available
coverage.56
4.1 Policy options and considerations
In the aftermath of major oil accidents, such as the DWH,
it is crucial to consider potential ramifications including
the willingness of the global offshore energy insurance
market to participate in the efforts to establish and fix a
new liability limit for environmental pollution liability
insurance. Such a new limit of liability will have to be
supported by the availability of insurance coverage on
adequate terms and conditions in the global commercial
insurance market given the vulnerability of the insurabil-
ity of future off-shore oil spill hazards.
Faure and Wang state that as a major source of post-
disaster recovery financing, commercial insurance com-
panies have been forced to compensate for catastrophe-
related losses, even beyond their contractual policy obli-
gation, such as post 9/11 or in the aftermath of the
occurrence of Hurricane Katrina. The off-shore energy
insurance underwriters have reassessed their risk expo-
sures in response to newly perceived operational risks
involving blowouts, fires, explosions, lost control of
well and other non-hurricane risks and have accordingly
increased the limit of liability required, whilst at the same
time prioritising ‘OEE’ and ‘excess liabilities’ coverage
and not imposing extra high premiums, in an effort to
break the post DWH established cycle of a ‘hard’ energy
insurance market with scarcity of coverage and extremely
high premiums prices. In addition, many insurance market
experts supported the use of pre-disaster risk financing
mechanisms via the use of ‘reinsurance sidecars’, cata-
strophe bonds (‘CAT bonds’) or energy insurance finan-
cial futures and options so as to enable the managing and
financing large-scale oil spill disasters.57
5 Cyber-Risks and the Provision of
Cyber-Insurance Coverage
Together with the growth of both the information and
communication technology (ICT) and of the impact of
cyber-risks to the real-world business, increases the
demand for cyber-insurance.58
Traditionally cyber cover was mainly embedded in
other insurance products, such as business interruption
or professional liability insurance, but nowadays such
policies tend to exclude the cyber-related risks, due to
the complexity of such cyber risk and the potentially
catastrophic consequences.59 As a result, standalone
cyber-insurance policies have emerged, however the gap
still exists between insurers and assured, in relation to the
various differences and exclusions which exist between
standalone cyber-insurance contracts and traditional pro-
ducts. In addition, the severity or frequency of cyber-
events and the complexity of cyber risks, makes some
of these losses insurable and others not.60
However, insurers are able to provide coverage and
indemnity for third-party liabilities related to certain
security events occurring within an organization’s IT net-
work, for the costs arising from the damage of data or
software – such as the costs relating to recovering or
reconstituting the damaged data,61 as well as for costs
relating to extortion in the cyberspace, i.e. in this case in
56 M. Faure & H. Wang, The Use of Financial Market Instru-
ments to Cover Liability Following a Major Offshore Accident,
in Civil Liability and Financial Security for Offshore Oil and
Gas Activities 236–265, 238 (M. Faure ed., 2016).
57 Faure & Wang, supra n. 56, 236–265 at 238.
58 Petratos, Sandberg & Zhou, supra n. 6, 809–836 at 826–27;
Marsh, supra n. 7.
59 C. Siegel, T. Sagalow & P. Serritella, Cyber-Risk Manage-
ment: Technical and Insurance Controls for Enterprise-Level
Security, 11(4) Info. Systems Sec. 33–49 (2002); Petratos, Sand-
berg & Zhou, supra n. 6, 809–836 at 813–814.
60 Marsh, supra n. 7.
61 This is so because insurers are able to require the policy holders
to follow necessary procedures of data backup or redundancy;
Petratos, Sandberg, Zhou, supra n. 6, 809–836 at 813–814.
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terms of cover provided for the cost of handling both the
cyber incident per se and any related ransom payment.
Cyber risks that are classified either as uninsurable or
insurable but with certain constraints that may lead to
specific exclusions in coverage, include the risk for repu-
tational losses, i.e. losses directly linked to reputational
damage, such as the cost of recovering public image or
loss of revenue from existing customers; the risk for net-
work business interruption; the risk for physical asset
damage as a result of cyber incidents; the risk for death
and bodily injury resulting from certain cyber-related
incidents from the use of certain equipment (e.g. medical
devices, large-scale industry equipment, driverless cars,
etc.).62 The costs incurred by cyber events can largely be
differentiated among first and third party losses. First-
party losses relate to expenses the firm incurred as a
direct result of the incident. Third-party losses, relate to
costs incurred due to private litigation, or fines or fees
brought by government agencies. It should be noted that,
whilst aggregate rates of cyber events and litigation are
more frequent and therefore potentially more expensive to
organizations collecting and using personal information,
on the other hand, such events cost most firms less than
USD 200k, which corresponds to only a fraction of the
costs commonly cited, a low percentage of firm revenues,
and, in any case, far less than other losses due to fraud,
theft, corruption, or bad debt.63
5.1 Challenges imposed to the development of the
cyber-insurance market
In terms of the challenges faced in relation to the devel-
opment of the cyber insurance market, the US insurance
market is more mature than the European market, most
notably the UK one, in terms of its response to cyber
risks.64 According to the European Network and Informa-
tion Security Agency (ENISA), a number of obstacles to
the development of a cyber-insurance market in Europe
include the difficulty of estimating the extent of the risk
and potential losses and a falsely established perception
that the existing insurance products offer these coverages,
no matter how fragmented such coverage may be,
together with the lack of clarity as to the definition of
insurable cyber risks. 65
Gummow and Devilling argue that the cost to busi-
nesses affected by data breaches and other cyber hack
incidents can prove crippling, not least due to the post
cyber breach costs. Despite the potentially catastrophic
threat that cyber breaches pose, a large proportion of
businesses do not include in their mitigating efforts a
cyber-insurance policy, but instead might opt to accept
the risk, whilst others might believe that traditional insur-
ance policies provide coverage.66
Middleton and Kazamia cite as general reasons, for the
low numbers in cyber-insurance policies, the non-avail-
ability of such insurance or the fact that the coverage
offered by the types of available products is either insuf-
ficient or cost-prohibitive.67 They go on to argue that in
spite of attempts for a clearer definition of cyber-related
terms,68 there seems to be some lack of clarity on the
exact meaning of these notions.69 They conclude that as a
result, it is difficult to reach consensus within the insur-
ance market as to the risks that a specialized cyber-insur-
ance policy is expected to be addressing, especially taking
into account that the legislation addressing that cyber-
crime is often fragmented. Being less developed than
the US cyber-insurance market, the European market
cannot adapt to more flexible premium adjustment. This
has the consequence that businesses are usually faced
with uncertainty regarding cyber-insurance coverage, the
available coverage, limits and exclusions. In addition,
courts have varied widely in their interpretation of cover-
age provisions for cyber losses. All of which creates
uncertainty in the landscape. However, cyber-insurance
should aim to become a valuable risk management tool,
able to address a big part of the damage in case of a
successful attack.70
5.1.1 First-party coverage: Are cyber-losses ‘physical
loss or damage’ under traditional principles of
property insurance law?
Some property policies expressly exclude cyber coverage
and in such cases courts have also held that cyber losses
are not covered. Accordingly, courts have held that cyber
losses are not covered, in cases where a policy is silent as
to whether cyber coverage exists. In Ward Gen. Ins.
62 Petratos, Sandberg & Zhou, supra n. 6, 809–836 at 826–827.
63 S. Romanosky, Examining the Costs and Causes of Cyber-
Incidents, 2(2) J. Cybersecurity 121–135, 129 (2016)
64 European Network and Information Security Agency
(ENISA), Incentives and Barriers of the Cyber Insurance Mar-
ket in Europe, 1, 4, http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resi-
lience-and-CIIP/national-cyber-security-strategies-ncsss/incen-
tives-and-barriers-of-the-cyber-insurancemarket-in-europe
(accessed 3 Mar. 2020); K. Middleton & M. Kazamia, Cyber
Insurance: Underwriting, Scope of Cover, Benefits and Con-
cerns, in The ‘Dematerialized’ Insurance 192–199 (P. Marano,
I. Rokas & P. Kochenburger eds, Springer 2016).
65 Ibid.
66 S. Gummow & S. Devilling, Insurance Coverage for Cyber-
Risk Exposures 1–25, 1–2 (New Appleman On Insurance 2017).
67 Middleton &Kazamia, supra n. 64, 192–199; R. Tendulcar, Joint
Staff Working Paper of the IOSCO Research Department andWorld
Federation of Exchanges Staff Working Paper, SWP1, 1 (2013).
68 Such as ‘cyber-resilience’, ‘cyber-security’, ‘cyber-crime’,
etc.; Middleton & Kazamia, supra n. 59, 192–199.
69 Middleton & Kazamia, supra n. 64, 192–199; European Data
Protection Supervisor, Opinion on the Joint Communication and
of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy on a ‘Cyber Security Strategy of the
European Union: An Open, Safe, and Secure Cyberspace’, and
on the Commission Proposal for a Directive Concerning Mea-
sures to Ensure a High Common Level of Network and Informa-




70 Middleton & Kazamia, supra n. 64, 192–199; Gummow &
Devilling, supra n. 61, 1–25 at 1–2.
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Servs., Inc. v. Employers Fire Ins. Co., 71 the court heav-
ily relied on liability coverage cases interpreting data loss
under insuring provisions in CGL policies.
Courts are fragmented in their rulings. In America
Online Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co.,72 the court
concluded that computer data is not tangible physical
property; however, to the extent that the software inter-
fered with the computer’s operating system and prevented
individuals from using their computers, it constituted loss
of use of tangible property. However, in Cincinnati Ins.
Co. v. Professional Data Services, Inc.,73 the court con-
cluded that there was no insurance coverage, as loss of
software had not resulted in tangible loss of the hardware.
The court distinguished America Online Inc. v. St. Paul
Mercury Ins. Co.,74 noting that it involved allegations that
computers were rendered inoperable as a result of the
software at issue.75 However, some courts have held that
a loss of data constitutes physical damage. In Landmark
Am. Ins. Co. v. Gulf Coast Analytical Labs., Inc.,76 the
court held that loss of data constituted as physical, even if
intangible, because it can be observed and altered through
human action. In Am. Guarrantee & Liab. Ins. Co. v.
Ingram Micro, Inc.,77 the court interpreted physical
damage as not being restricted to physical destruction or
harm but as including loss of access, loss of use and loss
of functionality. The Am. Guarrantee & Liab. Ins. Co. v.
Ingram Micro, Inc.78 case, illustrates an important dis-
tinction in property insurance cases, as it involved the lost
programming information critical to the performance of
the computer system at issue.79 However, in 2016, in the
case of Apache Corp. v. Great American Insurance Co.,80
which was a case that required from the Court to construe
computer fraud coverage in a crime protection policy, the
Fifth Circuit held that losses due to e-mail-based fraud
schemes that do not involve actual hacking are not cov-
ered by a typical computer provision. In 2018, the US
Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit held contrary on similar
facts in American Tooling Ctr., v. Travelers Cas. & Surety
Co. of America,81 and found that the plaintiff, American
Tooling Ctr., suffered a direct loss by computer fraud.82 In
more recent years, insurers have begun to provide specific
insurance coverage for cyber risks via the addition of
optional coverage extensions to traditional property insur-
ance policies. Whilst such extensions bring data losses
into the scope of coverage, still limitations exist because
coverage for cyber losses usually depends on what caused
the losses. If the cause is not covered, the data loss will
not be covered. In addition, numerous policy exclusions
may affect the terms of coverage for cyber losses, as there
may be exclusions specific to the cyber endorsement, or
elsewhere in the policy, that limit the scope of cyber
coverage.83
5.1.2 Cyber coverage under a CGL policy
For companies without specific cyber-risk insurance cov-
erage, coverage is sought under a CGL policy, whereby
typically the claimant will be alleging that the assured
negligently permitted hackers to access its computer sys-
tems and data. Coverage A of the CGL policy provides
coverage for liability owed to a third-party for an occur-
rence or a wrongful act resulting in bodily injury or
property damage, for which the assured is legally obliged
to pay damages. Occurrence is usually defined as an
accident which does not include intentional acts. America
Online Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co.,84 is one of the
leading cases analysing whether cyber losses constituted
physical damage. Coverage B of a CGL policy provides
coverage for certain cyber-related claims, i.e. for the sums
that the assured becomes legally obliged to pay as
damages.85
5.1.3 War risk coverage or exclusion under cyber
insurance coverage?
Most companies today maintain CGL coverage, which
protects from financial loss, broadly providing defence
and indemnity coverage for claims of bodily injury and
property damage. But whether a CGL policy will protect
businesses from cyberattacks is not always clear. In addi-
tion to it depending largely upon the facts of the case,
state courts addressing the issue have been inconsistent.
While some courts in the US have found that coverage
exists (Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Portal Healthcare
Solutions, LLC86; Eyeblaster, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co.87)
others have denied claims for data breach under CGL
71 Ward Gen. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Employers Fire Ins. Co., 114
Cal. App. 4th 548,550, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 844, 846 (2003).
72 America Online Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 207 F.
Supp. 2d 459, 468–469 (E.D. Va. 2002).
73 Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Professional Data Services, Inc.,2003
US Dist. LEXIS 15859 (D. Kan. 18 July 2003).
74 America Online Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 207 F.
Supp. 2d 459, 468–469 (E.D. Va. 2002).
75 Gummow & Devilling, supra n. 66, 1–25 at 3–4.
76 Landmark Am. Ins. Co. v. Gulf Coast Analytical Labs., Inc.,
2012 US Dist. LEXIS 45184 (M.D. La. 30 Mar. 2012).
77 Am. Guarrantee & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Ingram Micro, Inc., 2000
US Dist. LEXIS 7299 (D. Ariz. 18 Apr. 2000).
78 Ibid.
79 Gummow & Devilling, supra n. 66, 1–25 at 3–5.
80 Apache Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 2016 WL 6090901 (5th
Cir. Oct. 18 2016); See also Great Am. Ins. Co. v. AFS/IBEX
Fin. Servs., Inc., CIV. A. 307-CV-924-O, 2008 WL 2795205 (N.
D. Tex. 21 July 2008), aff’d. 612 F. 3d 800 (5th Cir. 2010).
81 American Tooling Ctr., v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of
America, US Court of Appeals (6th Cir. 13 July 2018).
82 A. Johnson, Twenty-first Century Insurance: Cyber Insur-
ance, (8) Computer & Internet Law. 4–25, 4–5 (2019).
83 GTE Corp. v. Allendate Mut. Ins. Co., 372F.3d. 598, 601 (3d
Cir. 2004).
84 America Online Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 207 F.
Supp. 2d 459, 468–469 (E.D. Va. 2002).
85 Recall Total Information Management, Inc. v. Federal Ins.
Co., 147 Conn. App. 450, 83 A.3d 664 (2014); Gummow &
Devilling, supra n. 61, 1–25 at 11–14.
86 Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Portal Healthcare Solutions,
LLC, 644 Fed. Appx. 245 (4th Cir. 2016).
87 Eyeblaster, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 613 F.3d 797 (8th Cir.
2010)).
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policies (Zurich American Insurance Co. v. Sony Corp. of
America88; Recall Total Info. Mgmt. v. Fed. Ins. Co.).89
Given this jurisdictional uncertainty and the fact that
the standard CGL ISO policy form and many CGL
polices in general have been amended in recent years to
contain exclusions for breaches from cyberattacks, many
companies have fittingly turned to specific cyber liability
coverage to fill the gaps, including special war risk cover-
age. Cyber liability policies typically cover a variety of
liability and property losses or some combination of tra-
ditional liability coverage protecting against claims by
third parties, and first-party coverage protecting against
losses suffered by the insured. However, cyber policies
often feature various broadly worded exclusions that can
limit or preclude coverage. Some commentators have
suggested that the so-called war risk exclusion might be
a viable means for insurers to exclude coverage for cyber
risks. Both CGL policies and cyber liability policies gen-
erally exclude coverage for ‘acts of war’ or ‘warlike
activity’. Whether or not a particular cyberattack or data
breach is considered an act of war is critical to whether
the exclusion applies. The problem is that there is no
universal definition of war, let alone agreement on what
constitutes an act of war in the cyber context. Different
government entities and different insurance carriers define
war in different ways. And while the language in CGL
policies is more uniform, there is no standard form on
which the insurance industry as a whole underwrites
cyber coverage. Cyber insurance is still in its relative
infancy, and the language contained in cyber policies
thus tends to vary significantly.
In addition, insurers always have the burden to prove
an exclusion application. The war risk exclusion presents
insurers with a particularly formidable evidentiary chal-
lenge in the cyber context. Courts have traditionally inter-
preted the war exclusion narrowly, defining ‘war’ as a
physical event involving two sovereigns or quasi-sover-
eign governmental entities. Thus, without direct involve-
ment by a sovereign state, the war exclusion would
generally not bar coverage.90
In the immediate aftermath of the 11 September 2001
attacks, there was intense political pressure on the insur-
ance industry not to invoke the ‘war risk’ exclusion con-
tained in any responsible party’s liability policy, and the
consensus depicted among some insurance commentators
was that the ‘war risk’ exclusion was inapplicable any-
way. Such a conclusion was generally based on the Sec-
ond Circuit’s 1974 decision in Pan American World
Airways v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.91 where the
Court of Appeals held that a war risk exclusion did not
preclude coverage for the hijacking and destruction of an
airplane by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Pales-
tine. The court’s rationale was that English and American
cases dealing with the insurance meaning of ‘war’ have
defined it in accordance with the ancient international law
definition stating that war refers to and includes only
hostilities carried on by entities that constitute govern-
ments or entities that have at least significant attributes of
sovereignty. Applying the above rationale to Pan
American World Airways v. Aetna Casualty and Surety
Co.,92 the court held that the loss of the Pan American
747 was in no sense proximately caused by any ‘war’ as
the latter is to be defined. This ‘war risk’ exclusion was
likewise adopted to the events of September 11th even if
in the end the insurers did not invoke the ‘war risk’
exclusion and going forward the focus turned to the
insurability of losses arising out of terrorist attacks. How-
ever, in In re September 11 Litigation,93 the issue was
whether the ‘act of war’ exception to CERCLA liability
constituted a defence to the plaintiff’s claims, the court
held that it did, addressing also Pan American World
Airways v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.94 and deciding
that it was distinguishable and expressing its unwilling-
ness to treat ‘war’ as a static concept.95
The nature of cyber incidents is problematic for
insurers.96 Although any insurer seeking to rely on the
war exclusion to preclude coverage for cyber risks faces
an uphill climb, it is nevertheless important for policy-
holders to be mindful of applicable policy terms, condi-
tions, and exclusions. All exclusions are not created
equally and because there is no definitive answer, as to
when a cyberattack may be considered an act of war
thereby excluding coverage, companies should in an
abundance of caution resist the inclusion of such boiler-
plate exclusions, and, instead, negotiate the specific inclu-
sion of cyberwar and terrorism coverage to ensure that a
broad range of events will be covered regardless of
motive or origin.97
5.2 Globalization and security challenges arising
from cyber-attacks: policy options
Globalization and technological evolutions are forcing
drastic changes in our lives. While the internet and new
technologies (Internet of Things (IoT), Artificial
88 Zurich American Insurance Co. v. Sony Corp. of America,
No. 651982/2011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 24 Feb. 2014).
89 Recall Total Info. Mgmt. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 147 Conn. App. 450
(Conn. App. Ct. 2014.
90 Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 505
F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974).
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
93 In re Sept. 11 Litig., 931 F. Supp. 2d 496, 511 (S.D.N.Y.
2013).
94 Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 505
F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974).
95 R. J. Maniloff, Coverage Opinions – September 11th: Revi-
siting The ‘War Risk’ Exclusion, White and Williams, LLP,
https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/insurance/b/exclu-
sions/posts/coverage-opinions-september-11th-revisiting-the-
war-risk-exclusion (accessed 3 Mar. 2020).
96 In re Sept. 11 Litig., 931 F. Supp. 2d 496, 511 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) loosening the act of war exclusion to extend to claims
arising out of 9/11 and distinguishing the Pan Am. World Air-
ways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir.
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Intelligence (AI)) have connected people like never
before, technological advances come with many inherent
challenges, such as cyber-attacks.
Policy recommendations to address cyber-attacks
include the continuation of investment in resources so as
to combat such cyber threats. In addition to funding the
existing programs, governments need collaborate with
private companies so as to train their personnel so as to
be able to address cyber-attack challenges. Also, govern-
ments should continue to promote cybersecurity programs
through other additional mechanisms (e.g. more grant
money to fund cybersecurity research).98
Big or small scale cyber or war risk attacks, the
challenge for insurers will likely be that, as with
September 11th, demands will be made on them to
provide immediate answers to coverage questions. As
In re September 11 Litigation99 demonstrates, the facts
that will determine coverage under the circumstances
will not likely be immediately available, and, for that
matter, may not be available for significant periods of
time. 100
6 Cyber Threats in the Energy Sector:
Insurance as a Mechanism to
Address Cyber Risks in Oil and Gas
Installations
In the energy sector, oil and gas companies face unique
cyber risks which make cyber-security even more chal-
lenging and calls for separate cyber insurance, usually
appearing as first-party coverage (data loss, business
interruption, network failure and other cyber losses) or
as third-party coverage (liability and defence cost insur-
ance for claims brought by third parties).
A frequently encountered problem in insurances for oil
and gas cyber-attacks is the fact that although such attacks
pose a risk of environmental liability, cyber insurance
policies may limit or bar coverage entirely for claims
involving the release of pollutants, for which the industry
faces significant exposures and whereby broadly worded
liability policies will often contain exclusions barring
coverage for any loss arising from cyber events. This
entails that policyholders will need to look for insurance
update or revisions to maintain adequate coverage in
place and to regularly negotiate and amend policies so
as to be able to address any specific cyber risks that may
surface.101
Coverage issues for cyber risks are usually exemplified
in a lack of awareness about the availability of specific
coverage and a lack in the harmonization of the policy
language and conditions.102 Moreover, in relation to the
Arctic, the increased exposure to environmental threats
and climate change forge the need to protect critical
infrastructure. For the effective management of cyber
threats, both the public and private sectors should be
involved in managing the interests of stakeholders. Not
least, because at the international, EU and national levels,
there is a lack of legal uniformity for the protection of
critical infrastructure, insurance can play a mitigating
role.103
However, the provision of such insurance coverage can
prove to be problematic because there is a difficulty in
understanding cyber risk both from the insurer’s and the
policyholder’s point of view, as the policyholder may not
understand the products or their own needs, whilst the
insurer may not be able to assess the risk due to a lack of
data, or due to a systemic nature of major potential events.
All of this may result in difficulties to understand the
dimension and the accumulated risks for the market as a
whole, lead the insurers towards writing cyber risk on the
least possible amount of information, and result in under-
priced risk covers. In addition, the insurance market faces
substantial difficulties in properly quantifying and fund-
ing the risks involved as a result of the increase in the
connectivity of destructive attacks and of the potential
subsequent aggregation risk.
Overall, of the key concerns raised by insurers in their
effort for a deeper understanding of cyber risk is the
broadness of coverage, terms and conditions, the difficul-
ties in properly quantifying risks, the risk of under-pri-
cing, the lack of appropriate reinsurance coverage, the
improper address of silent risks, the lack of historical
data, the insufficient information on risks, the systemic
nature of potential events and the lack of specialized
underwriters.
As a result, even if the cyber insurance industry is
growing, the insurance risks are not fully understood,
due to the scarcity or lack of sufficient amounts of claims
data, the difficulty in measuring the relevance to the
current or the future cyber landscape because of the
rapid technological advances, the lack of specialized
underwriters, data and quantitative tools, all of which,
together with the passing of the proper regulation, could
help to address some of the identified challenges and
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99 In re Sept. 11 Litig., 931 F. Supp. 2d 496, 511 (S.D.N.Y.
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100 Fonseca & Rosen, supra n. 98, 57–106.
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Besides Constraints: Human Security and a Cyber Multi-Dis-
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Lapponica 90, 92, 102–103 (G. Zojer ed., Arctic Centre, Lap-
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therefore enhance the development of the industry and the
provision of proper coverage to the economy.104
7 The EU and EU Arctic States
Response
The energy sector is experiencing changes at a scale and
pace that are unprecedented in more than a century. These
are driven by the urgency of actions required to mitigate
climate change and formulate a strategy to provide ade-
quate cyber security via the implementation of laws and
other legislative or non-legislative recommendations,
such as the alignment of cyber security activities across
all critical infrastructure; the development of security
standards for energy systems or the establishment of a
stakeholder network for energy security.105
Of the EU/EEA countries closely connected to the
Arctic, Denmark, in its strategy for the Arctic 2011–
2020 addresses the need in developing the Arctic while
appreciating its human impact, i.e. the economic and
social integration of the population and with sensitivity
to environmental concerns. For the exploration and
exploitation of oil and gas resources, as per the Greenland
Mineral Resources Act, the licensee must ensure that
safety, environmental and health risks are identified,
assessed and reduced, and a strategic environmental
impact assessment exists to ensure that any oil/gas activ-
ities can be implemented on an environmentally sustain-
able basis.106 The same applies for Finland which is also
committed to the sustainable development in the utiliza-
tion of the economic growth potential in the Arctic
region. In line with comprehensive security thinking, Fin-
land strengthens its capacity to identify wide-ranging
hybrid influencing against society, and the capabilities to
improve cyber security. 107
Cyber insurance may be the vehicle towards the
enhancement of cybersecurity via the adoption of best
practices. This is because insurance providers usually
require a level of security or protective measures as a
precondition of coverage and offer lower insurance rates
to companies adopting adequate security measures.
Therefore, the adaptation of best practices, is a vehicle
to encourage investments and improvements that further
bolster cybersecurity.108 However, underwriting some
cyber exposures can prove to be a difficult task, as they
pertain to not only the physical buildings and properties,
but also critical engineering, production, distribution, and
emergency systems. In addition, the insurance industry
may not have the capacity to underwrite some exposures
because a number of open questions remain on how one
can quantify and underwrite some of these exposures, the
threats to systems supporting critical infrastructure are
evolving and growing and because reliable indicators of
measuring the frequency or the economic impact of
cyber-attacks are rarely available. Thus, protecting and
insuring these many components of critical infrastructure
is a challenging, ongoing task for the insurance industry,
as well as for the policymakers.109 Notwithstanding the
above remarks, the insurance industry can still play a
critical role as risk manager, underwriter and investor in
addressing cyber security risks, which may hinder its’
function as a risk mitigation mechanism,110 however, for
such a mitigation mechanism and role for the insurance
industry it is absolutely necessary that it be backed up by
a robust regulatory environment.
The EU has a high level of energy security including
the oil and gas sector. As the production, distribution and
use of energy is becoming increasingly digitalized, this
provides increased opportunities for malicious actors to
carry out attacks on the energy system, notably cyber-
attacks. The key EU law for the protection of critical
infrastructure is Council Directive 2008/114/EC on criti-
cal European infrastructures which establishes procedures
for identifying and designating European critical infra-
structures (ECI) and introduces a common approach for
assessing their protection and the need to improve it,
requiring owners or operators of designated ECI to pre-
pare advanced business continuity plans (operator secur-
ity plans) for critical infrastructure protection. In April
2019 the European Commission issued Recommendation
(EU) 2019/553, containing guidelines that Member States
and key stakeholders should take into account when mak-
ing decisions about infrastructure and with protection
measures against cyber-attacks. In June 2019, the Com-
mission published an evaluation of Directive 2008/114/
EC on critical European infrastructures, which found that
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the Directive’s relevance has diminished and that the
Directive has failed to establish a common approach to
the assessment of critical infrastructure protection mea-
sures. In addition, the Cybersecurity Act (Regulation
(EU) 2019/881 cybersecurity package) aims to strengthen
the EU’s response to cyber-attacks, improve cyber-resili-
ence and increase trust in the digital single market.111
Adding to the regulatory framework, cyber insurance
may be the vehicle towards the enhancement of cyberse-
curity via the adoption of best practices. This is because
insurance providers usually require a level of security or
protective measures as a precondition of coverage and offer
lower insurance rates to companies adopting adequate
security measures. Therefore, the adaptation of best prac-
tices is a vehicle to encourage investments and improve-
ments that further bolster cybersecurity.112 However,
underwriting some cyber exposures can prove to be a
difficult task, as they pertain to not only the physical
buildings and properties, but also critical engineering, pro-
duction, distribution, and emergency systems. In addition,
the insurance industry may not have the capacity to under-
write some exposures because a number of open questions
remain on how one can quantify and underwrite some of
these exposures, the threats to systems supporting critical
infrastructure are evolving and growing and because reli-
able indicators of measuring the frequency or the economic
impact of cyber-attacks are rarely available. Thus, protect-
ing and insuring these many components of critical infra-
structure is a challenging, ongoing task for the insurance
industry, as well as for the policymakers.113 The insurance
industry can play a critical role as risk manager, under-
writer and investor in addressing climate change goals,
targets and key barriers that hinder its’ function as a risk
mitigation mechanism.114
8 Conclusion
As climate change accelerates, ice melts in the Arctic
faster than ever before and poses the Arctic energy
scene in the forefront due to the oil and gas potential
entailed.115
It has been argued that the global oil and gas industry
needs make firm commitments for the sustainable devel-
opment of oil and gas in the Arctic, as the prospect of
expropriation in it of yet non-explored reserves is close to
realization.116 Hence, there is an imminent need for mea-
sures to help protect the Arctic environment and mitigate
any potential harm. Insurance for environmental and
cyber-incidents from the expropriation of oil and gas in
the Arctic is indispensably needed and linked to this new
prospect of financial activity in the area. Such insurance
coverage needs to be specifically worded and underwrit-
ten so as to cover the gradual character of occurrence of
environmental harm as far as the environmental liability
coverage is concerned, given the feature of ‘sudden’ and
‘unexpected’ loss coverage which is usually found in
property casualty policies, and at the same time provide
adequate coverage for cybersecurity occurrences.
Advances in communications and technology encom-
pass inherent challenges, such as the threat of cyberterror-
ism. Accordingly, cybersecurity has been elevated to one
of the most important national security threats on the
security agenda of many countries.117 It has also been
argued that a catastrophic cyber event could bring major
losses to Lloyd’s reinsurers, as reinsurers could be
exposed to the full limits on policies that were originally
intended to cover property damage or casualty lines in
case a cyber ‘hack’ is found to be the proximate cause of
loss.118
Case law is evolving rapidly in relation to cyber issues,
although it appears to have a fragmented approach. Policy
language is critical to the evaluation of cyber-related
claims, particularly win relation to non-cyber policies,
and given the growing tendency of insurers to revise
policies so as to address cyber-risk.119
It has been stated also that because on the one hand,
cyber-attacks can be epidemic and because on the other
hand, there is limited coverage for cyber liability under
general commercial policies, any cybersecurity policy
should be a primary policy, so as to be able to respond
first.120 Given such a volatile legal landscape, the assureds
need to thoroughly examine their existing cyber coverage
and any applicable exclusions. Insurers need also under-
stand that many courts have stretched traditional coverage
principles to find coverage for cyber losses under policy
provisions traditionally applicable to physical losses.121
Finally, as reiterated also by Curran, Connolly and O’
Driscoll, it is essential to comprehend that, notwithstand-
ing the rapid growth of the cybersecurity industry, it is
still an industry in its infancy, with new insurance pro-
ducts and often limited coverage. It is imperative that all
companies try to mitigate the threats imposed by the
potential of a cyber-security incident in the energy sector,
and, hence, identify potential additional risks and try to
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have them minimized and transferred externally. One way
of doing so is via cybersecurity insurance. As cybersecur-
ity breaches and threats, such as the Saudi Aramco attack
in 2012 or the latest drone attack in Saudi Aramco’s
plants in September 2019, continue to hit headlines
worldwide, taking out a cybersecurity policy should be
as obvious as taking out any other type commercial gen-
eral liability insurance.122
It follows from the above that the globalization of
environmental risk is more intense than ever before nowa-
days, not least because of the challenges that the threat of
potential cyber-risks occurrences have imposed. Although
the civil liability regime for marine and oil pollution has
extended the scope of compensation obligations to
include environmental impairment – nevertheless and
given that vulnerability to cyber-attacks increases – cyber
insurance for risks related to malicious cyber-attacks on
the infrastructure of oil and gas installations is an impera-
tive insurance coverage element that all players in the
field should have, as the Saudi Aramco incidents have
revealed.
As argued in this article, the usually encountered
‘sudden’ and ‘unexpected’ loss coverage in property
casualty policies, is not appropriate for environmental
pollution coverage which by definition and nature is
usually gradually occurring. Often, natural resources
expropriation companies obtain property damage cover-
age and add casualty coverage for covering clean-up
and third-party liability. It is notable that the DWH
incident which was dramatic both in nature and in
extent, led to the establishment of a ‘hard’ energy
insurance market with scarcity of coverage and high
premiums. However, the threat and frequency of
cyber-risks have provided the need for specific and
separate additional coverage for cyber terrorism and
cyber risks. This in turn has been anticipated to re-
establish a ‘soft’ hence more pragmatic and accessible
energy insurance market, medium and long-term.
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